This article analyses founding family influence on pay-out policies for Swiss listed firms over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010]. We hypothesise that family firms have different incentives and characteristics that affect pay-out decisions and propose three possible explanations: agency theory, reputation building and family income needs. Our results show that founding family firms display significantly higher dividend pay-outs relative to companies with other ownership structures. We also examine specific family characteristics and document that the family stake, the active involvement and generation of the family play an important role for pay-out policies. Our findings appear to be consistent with the family income hypothesis and to some extent with reputational concerns.
Introduction
Pay-out policy is one of the central research questions in corporate finance. Since the seminal papers of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) , numerous authors have proposed models to explain the patterns observed in the cash amounts distributed by companies to their shareholders. Most of these studies have been designed in an environment with a clear separation between management and ownership and in which the company is owned by a large number of small shareholders. However, recent literature has shown that this is not the most common form of ownership structure around the World and that a majority of companies has a controlling shareholder (see Claessens et al. (2000) for Asia and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western Europe). Moreover, families appear to be the most frequent type of controlling shareholder. In a recent survey, De Angelo et al. (2009) point out that the preferences of the controlling shareholder potentially have a first-order impact on pay-out policy. The explicit consideration of the motivations of the largest shareholder might therefore help us better understand the observed patterns in pay-out policies. However, only a few articles address this issue in the literature. Our paper thus tries to fill this gap by examining founding families' influence on pay-out policies of listed companies in Switzerland. It specifically focuses on the difference between founding family firms 1 and other companies with respect to the amounts they distribute to their shareholders.
The financial decisions of a firm with a controlling shareholder can differ substantially from the decisions of a widely held firm as the majority shareholder has the power to impose his views to the board, the management and to minority shareholders. The decisions might not be value maximising because they are aimed to satisfy the preferences of the controlling shareholder. A typical example is the expropriation of minority shareholders as documented in Johnson et al. (2000b) or Bertrand et al. (2002) . Faccio et al. (2001) more specifically address the link between the presence of an influential shareholder and dividends in Asia and Western Europe. They report that dividend rates are lower in Asia than in Western Europe and that this can be interpreted as evidence of minority shareholder expropriation due to the weaker investor protection that prevails in these countries.
The presence of a family as the controlling shareholder has an impact along different dimensions. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) review different characteristics that make family firms different from other companies. They highlight that features such as management with a long-term perspective, substitution to weak legal structures, and political connectedness might improve the economic efficiency of these firms. On the other hand, characteristics such as nepotism, family legacy and inheritance norms might have a negative impact on different aspects of the firm's performance. Several of these aspects have been investigated in the literature but only a few authors have analysed the impact of family ownership on the pay-out policy of publicly-listed firms. Chen et al. (2005) find little relationship between family ownership and dividend pay-out ratios in Hong Kong. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) document that, in Australia, family firms have higher pay-out ratios than non-family firms and the existence of a concave relationship between the family stake and dividend pay-out ratios. Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) analyse a sample of Japanese firms and document higher dividend pay-outs for family firms. Pindado et al. (2012) investigate a sample of companies from nine Eurozone countries over a ten year period. They find that family firms tend to have higher dividend pay-outs and that they tend to smooth their dividends more. Finally, Schmid et al. (2010) provide an analysis of the German market and find that family firms have higher pay-outs and also a higher propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms. They also consider repurchase activity but do not document any significant difference between the different types of firms. Their paper is the first to look at some specific characteristics of family firms such as the generation or the involvement of the family in the firm. They find that it is only second generation firms that have higher pay-outs and that an active involvement of the family does not have an impact on pay-out policy.
We extend the existing evidence by considering the impact of a number of characteristics of family firms on pay-out policy. We notably analyse the role of the active involvement of the family, the stake of the family, the generation of the family and the number of family members involved in the firm. We interpret our results in the light of three possible explanations. We consider the classical agency interpretation that claims that lower dividends are a sign of minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders. A second explanation for the observed pay-out policy is associated to reputational concerns of family firms. A third explanation is related to the fact that families have a considerable amount of their wealth invested in their firm. In this framework, dividends represent the only possible way to obtain an income for family members since they do not want to reduce their stake in the firm and lose control.
We investigate the pay-out policy of family firms on a comprehensive sample of companies listed on the Swiss exchange over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The Swiss market is characterised by a high ownership concentration, with owners ranging from founding families to private investors, the State, or other corporations. The law and finance literature relates concentrated ownership to the quality of legal protection of investors provided by the commercial law of a country. As La Porta et al. (1998) point out, German civil-law countries (including Switzerland) provide only average investor protection, but are very good in enforcing existing laws and display a low level of corruption (Djankov et al., 2008) . In this setting, a controlling shareholder may extract private benefits more easily and have an incentive to minimise dividends, as he acts from a position of strength vis-à-vis minority shareholders. Expropriation or misuse of company funds may therefore be considered a realistic explanation for pay-outs on the Swiss market. The results of our empirical analysis show that both dividends and total pay-outs tend to be higher in founding family firms than in non-family firms. In particular, univariate tests show that family firms on average pay out 33.7% of earnings as dividends while non-family firms pay out 24.5% on average. Regression analyses confirm these findings and show that family firms are the only type of blockholders on the Swiss market that pay higher dividends. These high pay-outs reduce the possibilities for the family or management to misuse company funds. The results tend to show that pay-out policies of family firms are not consistent with the minority shareholder expropriation explanation. Finer analyses reveal that the characteristics of family firms play an important role for pay-out ratios. We find that pay-out is positively related to the size of the family stake and that higher dividend and total pay-outs occur in family firms that (i) do not have a large second blockholder, (ii) are at the descendent stage and are older, (iii) do not have family members active in the management or the board. The higher pay-outs of family firms profit all shareholders. Our findings appear to be consistent with the family income hypothesis and to some extent with reputational concerns of family firms.
This article contributes to the existing literature in three important ways. First, it enriches the literature on the impact of a controlling shareholder on pay-out policy and it is one of the first comprehensive articles on pay-out policy in family firms. It confirms the evidence of higher pay-outs in family firms found in previous literature and indicates that the models on dividend policy should explicitly take into account the presence of family owners. Second, our paper expands knowledge in the field of founding family firms. This field has gained impetus with the article by Anderson and Reeb (2003) , but has so far mainly focused on the market and accounting performance of such firms. Different financial decisions taken by family firms have hardly received academic attention so far. The research of pay-out policies in family firms is, however, important as it helps to draw inferences about agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders and deals with an important monetary issue and source of returns for investors. Third, the article provides new evidence on the characteristics and scope of pay-out policies in Switzerland. So far evidence on pay-out policies in this market is very scarce with the exception of articles by Stacescu (2006) on dividend pay-outs and Chung et al. (2007) on share repurchases. Data on pay-outs in other German-civil-law countries is also not widely researched and primarily focuses on the German market.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses about the potential effects of family ownership on pay-out policies. Section 3 gives background information on the Swiss market and describes the data and variables used in the article. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 contains various robustness tests.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The impact of family firms on pay-out policy
Agency explanation of pay-out policies
In widely held companies the separation between ownership and control can cause problems and incur important costs to shareholders. One of these problems is the use of free cash-flows by managers. Jensen (1986) recognises that managers have incentives to overretain cash which allows them to divert resources to fund projects that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. In this context, high dividend payments reduce free cash-flows and are considered an effective way to mitigate these agency problems. In firms with a controlling shareholder, these agency problems should be lower since the majority shareholder has a stronger incentive to control managers. However, the divergence of interests between majority and minority shareholders becomes an issue and this might ultimately lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Illustrations of these problems are given by Johnson et al. (2000a) and Johnson et al. (2000b) who describe the transfer of company resources to insiders (i.e. controlling shareholders) as tunnelling.
Family firms face these conflicts as the controlling family is in a position to promote ideas or projects that do not primarily maximise firm value, but rather suit its own personal preferences. This may ultimately result in misuse of company funds, harm minority shareholders and reduce pay-outs to a minimum. We therefore hypothesise that the presence of agency problems is associated to lower pay-outs in family firms.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Agency problems in family firms are associated with lower pay-outs. Warther (1993) proposes a "sleeping dogs" approach to dividends, which is taken up by Zwiebel (1996) and Myers (2000) and in which managers propose pay-outs just large enough to avoid conflicts with share-or stakeholders. Gomes (2000) further develops this idea and shows that large shareholders may opt to build up a reputation of treating minority shareholders well. Under his model blockholders will commit not to expropriate minority shareholders even if these lack protection by effective governance mechanisms. In the context of family firms these effects can take two forms. First, the company might be owned by one or multiple family members and an outside CEO has to find a right balance. He has to satisfy family members and his personal needs, without conflicting between both. In their clinical study on the Times Mirror Company, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) describe exactly this phenomenon. The outside management of the family-owned company adapted its policies, and especially its dividend policy, to suit the cash distribution preferences of its controlling shareholder. Though very circumstantial the study clearly shows that some company managers will adjust their pay-out policy to please family members and hope for less monitoring in return. Second, in a more general setting in which family members are also actively involved in the firm as member of the management or the board of directors, they may try to pay out just enough to minority shareholders to keep them satisfied. The family will build a reputation for treating them well by paying higher dividends which would limit the misuse of the remaining excess cash. This reputation building behaviour can also be justified by the "substitution model" of La Porta et al. (2000) that posits that insiders tend to pay higher dividends when they are planning a future issuance of equity. Since family firms tend to have weaker governance than other firms because many internal governance mechanisms are ineffective, investors may be reluctant to subscribe to new equity from these firms. Higher dividends can therefore act as a substitute for the missing governance mechanisms. We hypothesise that in both cases, the willingness to build a good reputation by family firms leads them to return a larger fraction of their earnings to shareholders.
Reputation and pay-out policies
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Family firms pay higher dividends to ensure a good reputation
Family income and pay-out policies
Family ownership has two specific features. First, family members have a significant amount of their wealth invested in the firm and, second, the family wants to keep control of the company in the long run. In this situation, family members cannot sell shares to diversify their wealth or to fund consumption. Pay-out policy can then be used as means to satisfy the income needs of family members and this should create a desire for high dividend payments.
However, the existence and intensity of this effect will strongly depend on the number of family members involved in the firm. Dividend payments are likely to be higher when more family members are involved with the firm as the consumption of an increased number of family members has to be catered for. It is therefore important to distinguish between lone and multiple member family firms. A second distinction is the age of the firm. Older firms should have more family members involved. With a larger number of family members, the likelihood of having members that do not have an interest in the firm grows and a way to reconcile this divergence of interests is to pay higher dividends. The generational stage of the family should reflect the same phenomenon. It is therefore also important to consider the age of the firm and generation of the family when assessing the impact of the income desire on family firm pay-out policy.
In widely held companies, these questions are not relevant, as shareholders can easily buy and sell shares in line with their different consumption preferences. Moreover, these shareholders do not have enough power to alter dividend payments to cater for their needs.
We hypothesise that the need for family income will have a positive impact on pay-out policy of family firms. The Swiss stock market displays a relatively concentrated ownership. La Porta et al. (1998) attribute the occurrence of high ownership concentration to weak investor protection.
Switzerland ranks poorly in terms of the anti-director rights index (La Porta et al. (1998) ) and on the anti-self-dealing index proposed by Djankov et al. (2008) . It further has a nearly nonexistent albeit slowly evolving market for corporate control (Lowinski et al. (2004) ). This facilitates potential private benefit extraction by controlling shareholders. At the same time, Djankov et al. (2008) document that Switzerland has a very large financial market relative to the size of its economy which is surprising considering the low level of investor protection. The code follows a comply or explain approach which is largely inspired by the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom which leaves the application of the recommendations to the appreciation of each company and thus the controlling shareholder. It should be noted that since the code and directive essentially provide recommendations for widely held firms (and not for companies with a controlling shareholder), it cannot be claimed that Swiss companies have made uniform progress in the adoption of good corporate governance practices.
Data description
The sample includes all companies listed on the Swiss Exchange between 2003 and 2010. In concluding the process, all data related to corporate governance and ownership is finally merged with accounting and financial data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and
Datastream. This allows for reliable data and information on a vast array of companies from different industries, of different sizes and age and ownership structures.
Classification of firms with large shareholders and founding families
Following the extant literature on family firms and blockholders a company is defined as being widely held if no shareholder holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights (see among others Villalonga and Amit (2006) , Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Favero et al. (2006) ).
Although a threshold of 20% may seem low there exists a widely accepted view that due to generally low AGM attendance and active representation of blockholders either on the board 2 ICB stands for Industry Classification Benchmark and constitutes a system of industry classification issued by FTSE International Ltd.
3 Due to missing accounting data in Worldscope sometimes less than 1228 observations are used in some regressions. 4 The distinction between family firms and private investors ensures that pure financial investors are not mistaken for family firms. A private investor may not necessarily be a corporate raider or short term investor. In fact, most private investors in Swiss companies, though not having founded the company, have been invested in it for several years. or in management, in a majority of the companies 20% is sufficient for having an influence on company policies such as pay-out decisions.
A blockholder may have various identities. In the case of Swiss state ownership it may not only refer to the Swiss Federal Government but also regional (cantonal) and municipal government entities. Widely held industrial and financial corporations in this context are companies that themselves do not have a dominant shareholder. Miscellaneous covers blockholders that could not be classified into any other category. It is mostly composed of foundations, cooperatives, or private pension funds. Contrary to these rather straightforward classifications, firms with founding families and private investors as large shareholders need more attention. A private investor is defined as somebody that has neither founded the company nor shaped it in a substantial way over the years. In case there is more than one private individual it must clearly be stated that such investors have an agreement to vote together. The term founding family is used for one or more individuals or families that founded a company. Similar to private investors founding family firms may have been founded by more than one individual or family (for example families Hoffmann and Oeri for Roche or the Rihs brothers and Beda Diethelm for Sonova).
[Insert Table 1 about here] Based on these definitions and summarised in Table 1 , we have created different dummy variables that take the value one if a company falls in a specific category and zero otherwise.
Overall, the sample consists of 187 companies and 1228 firm year observations that can be divided into 444 founding family firm years and 784 non-founding family firm years.
Several studies put forward that family firm characteristics have an impact on firm performance and policies (e.g. Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006) , and Bennedsen et al. (2007) ). The dummy for founding family firms is therefore divided into several sub-groups. First, family ownership is analysed by distinguishing between founding families owning the majority of voting rights (i.e. more than 50% of votes), a very high stake (75% or more) or only holding a controlling stake between 20 and 50%. We also explicitly look at the specific family stake. We further divide founding family firms into groups depending on the active position and generation of family members. Some studies show that the number of family members involved in the company may have an effect on corporate policies or performance (e.g. Andres (2008) , Combs et al. (2010) , and Miller et al. (2011) ).
We, therefore, separate founding family firms in companies in which only one family member is involved and those in which multiple family members hold a stake and sometimes are active.
Pay-out variables
A company has different possibilities to pay out earnings or excess cash to its shareholders.
In this article three pay-out methods are analysed: dividends, the reduction of the nominal value of shares, and share repurchases. Following Julio and Ikenberry (2005) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) pay-out ratios are set to 100% if they turn negative due to negative earnings. Pay-out ratios are also set to 100% if firms pay more than 100% of their earnings.
Dividends constitute the most frequent form of distribution for Swiss companies. As in several other countries, dividends and capital gains are taxed differently. In practice, dividends are taxed twice, i.e. a first time at a company level on the net income the company generated and a second time as income tax for the investor receiving dividends. On the other side, capital gains are mostly tax exempt for private investors. The advantage of this technique lies in the tax-exemption of the reimbursement.
Since the amount of cash that can be distributed this way is limited, it is frequently used as a one-time distribution and not as a continuous pay-out method. We include the amount paid in such a way in our measure of dividend payments.
Over the last few decades, share repurchases have gained importance as a pay-out method throughout the world. In Switzerland, buybacks have been authorised since 1992. Chung et al. (2007) present the development of repurchases and the institutional setting in this country.
They show notably that the goal of the repurchase plays an important role for its tax treatment. More specifically they demonstrate that when stocks are repurchased to reduce share capital, private investors have to pay much higher taxes than for dividends and therefore have no incentive to tender their shares. On the other hand, when shares are repurchased to be kept as treasury stocks they are taxed as a capital gain. Over the period 2003-2010 we observe that 85% of share repurchase programmes in Switzerland were implemented in order to reduce share capital. This means that most of the repurchase offers did not represent an interesting alternative to dividend payments for private investors. Because of this special tax treatment, repurchase activity is not very intense on the Swiss market with on average less than 10% of firms repurchasing shares each year.
In this specific institutional setting, most shareholders of Swiss companies have a strong preference for dividend payments over share repurchases. This is further reinforced inside family firms in which families do not want to tender shares and lose control. We therefore only focus on dividend pay-outs in the main part of our analysis. Nevertheless, we also compute total pay-outs including repurchases and repeat our analysis for total pay-outs as a robustness check.
Descriptive statistics
On the basis of the definitions above, founding family firms account for 36% of the firms in the sample for the period 2003 to 2010, while 11% of companies have a private investor as a large shareholder. 37% are widely held companies, while 7% are owned by either industrial or financial companies, 5% are state owned, and 3% are categorised as miscellaneous.
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As can be seen in Table 1 , these numbers remain very stable over the sample period with only very few companies changing categories. Table 2 shows summary statistics for different variables. The average dividend pay-out ratio is 28% of earnings, 31% for total pay-outs and 1.65% for the dividend yield. Firms in the sample have an average size of 3.50 billion Swiss francs, an average annual sales growth of 8.41% and an average leverage of 27%.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Average Tobin's Q is 1.72, while average ROIC is 6.99% 7 . A closer look at founding family firms shows that in 40% the family has a stake between 20 and 50% while 60% own more than 50% of voting rights in their company. Around 36% of family firms are at the founder stage while the remaining 64% are owned by later generations. In 70% of family firms the family takes an active position in the company as either Chairman of the board, CEO or both 6 The proportion of family firms is comparable to findings in the study by Faccio and Lang (2002) who find 56% of family firms, while widely-held companies only account for 26%. Explanations for the different proportion of family firms in our sample may be found in the distinction between founding and non-founding family firms, a more rigorous definition of family firms and the different period examined. 7 To mitigate potential problems with outliers some control variables (i.e. 5-year sales growth, leverage, beta, ROIC and Tobin's Q) are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level before descriptive statistics are calculated.
while only in 30% they are passive owners. Finally, in a quarter of family companies only one family member is active in the company and/or holds shares alone. Table 3 shows results of the univariate analysis of the sample by testing differences of means and medians between family and non-family firms.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Founding family firms have both significantly higher dividend and total pay-outs as well as higher dividend yields. The distortion (wedge) between cash-flow and voting rights through multiple share classes is 1.55 for founding family firms but only 1.04 for non-family firms, a clear sign of family firms trying to preserve ultimate control in their companies. Kunz (2002) outlines that the number of companies with dual-class shares has dramatically decreased in the last 20 years in Switzerland. This shows that Swiss companies are now more inclined to follow the one share one vote principle. However, pressure from shareholders to change the voting structure has been less successful for companies in which a family is present. Both types of companies have a comparable size with around 3.5 billion CHF in assets and generating similar annual sales growth of some 8%. We observe that family firms have a significantly lower leverage and therefore use more equity to avoid depending on financial institutions or debtholders who may want to interfere in firm business. Although family firms perform significantly better as measured by ROIC, it is only translated by an insignificantly higher market performance measured as Tobin's Q.
Regression results
Following the results from a Hausman test, a random effect model is used to assess the relation between a company's dividend policy on the one side and founding family control on the other side. The data for this article is structured as an unbalanced panel of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2010. The amount paid out by a company is analysed using a random effect Tobit model taking the following general form.
where j denotes a company and t a year. Family firm is a dummy variable, which takes account of the different founding family firm characteristics. Control variables include firm size, firm age, leverage, sales growth, ROIC, Tobin's Q, beta and the wedge. Industry and year are dummy variables equalling 1 for the respective industry and year, and zero otherwise. Table 4 provides a detailed insight into the relation between dividend pay-outs and the ownership structure of companies. Column 1 indicates that companies with a blockholder do not differ from widely held companies in their dividend pay-out policy. Differences are insignificant, which implies that companies either behave similarly irrespective of their ownership structure or that the blockholder type may have an effect and should therefore be further analysed. In columns 2 to 4 we therefore, explicitly examine specific ownership types.
Ownership structures and dividends
Founding families appear to be special blockholders, as their dividend pay-out is significantly higher compared not only to non-family firms but also to widely held companies. Firms with other types of blockholders, however, have similar pay-outs to their widely held counterparts.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The previous findings suggest that founding family firms have higher pay-outs than other companies. This observation refutes hypothesis H1. We cannot totally eliminate the possibility that families display some rent extraction behaviours or that agency conflicts exist between them and minority shareholders. However, higher dividend payments curb available cash and thus strongly mitigate such concerns. Looking at column 4 it further appears that, among the different types of blockholders, only family companies pay more dividends. On the other side, financial institutions acting as blockholders have lower dividend pay-outs. This result may be related to the more complex relations financial institutions have by being not only shareholders but also debtholders and therefore preferring interest to dividend payments.
It is also possible that financial institutions monitor more effectively and are less prone to agency conflicts with minority shareholders. (see for example Goergen et al. (2005) ). Table 5 provides insights into the distribution of voting rights inside family firms. The ownership stake held by the family or the presence of another blockholder may influence dividend distributions in different ways.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Column 1 shows that family stake has a positive relation with dividend pay-outs. It appears that the families holding higher stakes in their companies have higher pay-outs. This result again refutes hypothesis H1 but gives some support to hypotheses H2 and H3. Families having a controlling stake (i.e. more than 50%) in their company can more easily expropriate minority shareholders. In the case H1 were true we would have expected to find a negative relation between the level of control and dividends which we do not find. Columns 2 to 4 confirm these results showing that dividends increase linearly with the family stake. One explanation can be found in the income diversification hypothesis. The higher the stake the more family wealth is tied up in the company. This leads to higher pay-outs as the family wants to consume or diversify part of its wealth. Interestingly, even for very high stakes for which it is easier to sell off shares to receive some funds without losing control, dividend payments are high. This observation also supports the reputational hypothesis in which shareholders pay out dividends to compensate minority shareholders for poor corporate governance. The absence of internal corporate governance mechanisms is especially pronounced in companies in which a family has a high stake.
Founding families appear to be concerned about their good reputation or at least make an effort to compensate minority shareholders for inefficient governance mechanisms. Both managers are better monitored and minority shareholders treated correctly by large shareholders. However, this situation might be altered if the company is controlled by more than one large shareholder. Attig et al. (2008) suggest that the impact of the presence of multiple blockholders strongly depends on their comparative size. Similar stake sizes should lead to higher contestability of control and thus increase information quality. This will result in a reduction of agency costs and possibilities to expropriate. We, thus, look at the relative power between the largest and second largest blockholder. Obviously, a second blockholder that has a similar stake to the largest shareholder will have more power and incentives to monitor. Results in column 5 show that pay-outs are highest in companies in which there is no second blockholder or in which its difference in stake relative to the family is high. In companies with blockholders of similar size pay-outs are still larger than in other companies but less so. Its presence constitutes an additional governance mechanism that will potentially curb the rent extraction behaviour of the family. Alternatively, the second blockholder being less invested in the company and thus having less wealth tied up in it may be less interested in high dividend payments than the family.
Overall, our initial findings reject hypothesis H1 as dividend payments are higher in companies with potentially higher agency costs. The reputational and income need hypothesis, however, both find some indirect support in the evidence displayed in Tables 4 and 5.
Family firm stage and dividends
Earlier studies on different financial aspects of family firms show that it would be wrong to judge family firms as such without further differentiation. Table 6 looks at the stage of the family and its firm.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Column 1 reports more detailed results on the generational distinction. Evidence suggests that both companies at the founder and the descendant stage pay out more dividends than other families. However, descendant stage firms appear to pay out slightly more. For descendants in many cases several family members might hold shares and must be compensated in an appropriate way, especially since not all will receive a compensation for an active position in management. These findings are in favour of the income need hypothesis. It has, however, also positive side-effects for minority shareholders. These probably benefit from a more effective monitoring of managers by the family as shown in several studies on family firm performance. It also restricts the access managers and family members have to cash and therefore minimises the possibility of private benefits extraction or investments in non-value maximising projects. Minority shareholders therefore benefit from both a highly efficient company but also from higher dividends. Families on their side have the opportunity to satisfy their income needs without losing control over their company and can sustain a reputation for treating minority shareholders fairly. Column 2 further supports the income need hypothesis as family firms tend to pay out more the older they get. We use age as a proxy for the number of family members a company has to cater for. This assumption seems reasonable as Ellul et al. (2010) find that Switzerland has restrictive inheritance laws. A testator cannot bequeath its estate to a single child but has to split it equally among all heirs.
We therefore hypothesise that the older a firm is, the larger the number of family members in the firm will be. The distinction between companies in which only one family member is present as opposed to several family members in column 3 again supports hypothesis H2 and H3. Companies with multiple family members pay out more dividends as more members have to be sustained by the company. At the same time even firms with a lone family member pay more dividends than non-family firms. In this case the owner should have a large fraction of his wealth invested in the company and needs some income to either diversify his wealth or simply for consumption purposes.
Overall, we see that younger firms or companies at the founder stage pay-out less than older or descendant-stage family firms. These findings give credit to hypotheses H2 and H3.
On the one side, agency problems and conflicts inside the company are more prone to occur in the presence of multiple family members or at the descendant stage. This can be counterbalanced by higher pay-outs to mitigate reputational concerns of the family. At the same time, the more family members are present, the more the company has to pay-out to satisfy all of them.
Family reputation and dividends
The reputation a company and family enjoys and wants to maintain will shape its decisionmaking. It will depend towards which stakeholders the reputation is geared and what the ultimate goal of reputation building is. In Table 7 we look at different proxies for company reputation. More specifically, we look at active management by a family member, the name of the firm and the need for additional funds by the company.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In the case the reputational hypothesis holds we expect that families actively managing the company or just being a passive investor should be indifferent to pay-outs. Column 1 reports that companies actively managed by a family member pay less than those in which the family is a passive investor. This result is in line with the "sleeping dogs" explanation where external managers or board members pay higher dividends to avoid too much control from the controlling shareholder. Column 2 analyses the general reputation of a company using its name as a proxy. In case the company bears the same name as the family, outsiders will more quickly associate the family with the firm. In this case, a potential reputational damage should be even more important and family shareholders should pay out more. Results in column 2 indicate that dividend pay-outs are similar in both companies with and without the family name on it. Though this does not exclude that some reputational effect exists, it does not provide a clear cut outcome in favour of it. In columns 3 and 4 we look at the company's financial reputation. A firm will tend to treat investors better if it needs access to additional funds via a seasoned equity offering. Especially in family companies for which investors are à priori reluctant to invest due to potential family conflicts and agency costs between the controlling and minority shareholders, fair treatment towards investors becomes crucial. We therefore hypothesise that companies that need to raise capital in year t+1 should increase dividends in year t to make themselves more attractive to outside investors. We create a dummy variable equal to one if the family firm has raised capital in year t+1. In column 3, we take a wider definition by looking at all means to increase share capital (including SEO and convertible bonds). In column 4 we specifically look at SEOs. In both cases we do not find higher pay-outs for family firms that raise capital in t+1 and those that do not.
Overall, results only partially support the reputational hypothesis H2. Although we cannot completely refute that reputation plays a role in fixing dividends inside family companies we do not find strong evidence backing it.
Robustness tests
Endogeneity might pose a potential problem when analysing family firms. One can argue that it is not a specific ownership structure that yields different pay-outs, but that on the contrary pay-out levels influences the decision of an owner to stay as a shareholder in a company. However, we do not believe that this is an issue for our study. During the sample period very few companies change their ownership structure from family firm to non-family firm. Those that do change ownership category display family stakes dropping from just above 20% to just below 20% and very often keep family members in an active position inside the company. Thus it is difficult to argue that families leave due to poor pay-outs of the company. It appears easier for a family to increase pay-outs to a level that is deemed satisfactory than to go through the long and uncertain process of selling the whole company.
It is equally significant that family firms have an average age of 68 years. It thus is difficult to believe that families sell their shares following poor pay-outs or inversely are able to correctly predict the future over such a long period of time.
A further concern is the misspecification of variables. Censoring pay-outs that are larger than 100% and putting negative pay-outs to both a value of 100% may have an important impact on results. We therefore run five new models (i) discarding negative pay-outs, (ii) not censoring pay-outs that are larger than 100% to this value, (iii) leaving large pay-outs but winsorising them at the 1-99% level, (iv) scaling dividends by cash-flows and (v) scaling dividends by total assets. Results in all five cases remain qualitatively very similar.
We then investigate the robustness of our results with respect to the definition of the payout. We compute the relative amount of share repurchases with respect to earnings and add it to the cash dividend pay-out used throughout the paper to measure total pay-outs.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The results in Table 8 are comparable to those in Table 4 and display qualitatively very similar results in the sense that founding family firms have higher total pay-outs than other companies. We also re-estimate the results for Table 5 to 7 and obtain similar outcomes.
Our pay-out variable might suffer from other problems. First, earnings might be manipulated by management. Second, earnings might be negative which raises problems for measuring objectively the pay-out ratio and finally, higher pay-outs are not directly relevant for financial market investors. We address all these concerns by running all our tests on the dividend yield as the dependent variable. This measure avoids all three problems mentioned above.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
The results in Table 9 are comparable to those in Table 4 and display qualitatively very similar results in the sense that founding family firms have higher dividend yields than other companies. This means that founding family firms provide higher dividends for stock market investors. We also re-estimate the results for Table 5 to 7 and find similar results.
We also examine other specifications to check that our results are not affected by some bias. First we re-estimate the main results using different econometric models. Some studies such as Maury and Pajuste (2002) use OLS instead of tobit regressions for estimating dividend pay-outs. We therefore conduct a classic OLS regression with year and industry dummies which qualitatively yields similar results. In a further step, we also estimate pooled average regressions and random effect OLS regressions but all result in comparable findings to the initial case.
We further use 1-year sales growth instead of 5-year sales growth, debt/equity instead of debt/capital as leverage, ln(sales) instead of ln(total assets) as size proxy. We then use a dummy for firms with multiple share classes instead of the wedge between ownership and voting rights. In this case firms are considered having multiple share classes even if they do not create an effective wedge. The main results are stable, when using these alternative control variables. In addition, we re-estimate the regressions without winsorising control variables or winsorising them at a 2.5% and 97.5%, instead of the 1% and 99% level. All results remain qualitatively similar.
We further explore the sensitivity of results to the use of utilities. For this, we exclude utilities as it can be argued that these companies are regulated and not entirely free in setting their company policies, especially with respect to capital structure and pay-outs. Discarding these companies from the sample does however not alter main results.
Finally, our results might be distorted by the use of an unbalanced sample. Companies that fall out of the sample during the period, either due to bankruptcies or takeovers, might have different pay-outs just before their disappearance. Similarly, companies that appear on the market during the examined period might not be able to pay out dividends yet and might bias results as most of these young companies should have a blockholder. We, therefore, run random-effects regressions for a balanced panel of firms that comprises 944 firm-year observations for 118 companies. The results indicate that firms dropping out or appearing in the sample do not affect our findings.
Conclusion
This article provides new evidence on the financial decisions of family firms. The paper examines the pay-out policies of founding family firms and offers new insights on the relation between controlling shareholders and pay-out policy. Using a unique dataset on the Swiss market over the period 2003-2010, we compare the pay-out policies of family firms with those of other companies. We find that family firms on average pay out 37.5% of earnings as dividends while non-family firms pay out 24.5% on average. We propose three possible explanations for the observed pay-out policies of family firms. We first consider the classic agency interpretation that claims that lower dividends are a sign of minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders. A second explanation for the observed pay-out policy is associated to reputational concerns of family firms. A third explanation is related to the fact that families have a considerable amount of their wealth invested in their firm. In this framework, dividends represent the only possible way to obtain an income for family members since they do not want to reduce their stake in the firm and lose control. In order to distinguish between these explanations, we investigate the impact of specific family firm characteristics on pay-out policies. We also find that pay-out is positively related to the size of the family stake and that higher dividend and total pay-outs occur in family firms that (i) do not have a second blockholder, (ii) are at the descendent stage and are older, (iii) do not have family members active in the management or the Board. Our findings appear to be consistent with the family income hypothesis and to some extent with reputational concerns of family firms.
This article contributes to the existing literature in different ways. First, it enriches the literature on the impact of a controlling shareholder on pay-out policy and it is one of the first comprehensive articles on pay-out policy in family firms. It confirms the initial evidence of higher pay-outs in family firms found in previous literature and indicates that the models on dividend policy should explicitly take the presence of family owners into account. Second, our paper expands knowledge in the field of founding family firms in general, and in particular in Switzerland. It complements the recent evidence found on the superior performance of family firms on this market by Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) and confirms that families are special blockholders. Further research should devote more attention to family characteristics when assessing the impact of family ownership on corporate policies. Table 2 Descriptive Statistics The pay-out variables for the analysed sample of 187 firms and 1228 firm-year observations includes dividend pay-out (dividend/earnings), pay-out (the sum of dividend and repurchases/earnings) and dividend yield (PS/share price). Ownership variables show the identity of a blockholder holding more than 20% while companies without a blockholder with more than 20% ultimate voting rights are labelled widely held. Family variables describe the size of the family stake (20-50% or more than 50%), the generational stage (founder and descendant), the active position of a family member as CEO or Chairman and the number of family members in the company as shareholder, CEO or Chairman. Control variables consist of the wedge which shows the ratio of voting rights over ownership rights, firm size (total assets in CHF 000), firm age, 5-year sales growth (in CAGR form), leverage (total debt/(debt and equity), beta of the company, ROIC and Tobin's Q.
Mean
Median Table 3 Univariate tests The variables for the analysed sample of 187 firms and 1228 firm-year observations from 2003-2010 include dividend representing dividend pay-out (dividend/earnings), pay-out (the sum of dividend and repurchases/earnings) and dividend yield (dividend per share/share price). Control variables consist of dual-class shares designating a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class, the wedge which shows the ratio of voting rights over ownership rights, firm age in years, firm size (total assets in CHF 000), 5-year sales growth (in CAGR form), leverage (total debt/(debt and equity), beta, ROIC and Tobin's Q. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 4 Dividends and ownership structure The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include dividend pay-outs, the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Blockholder is a dummy that equals one if a blockholder holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. Founding family is a dummy that equals one if members of the foundingfamily hold at least 20% of the voting rights. Private Investor, State, Industrial Corporation, Financial Corporation and Miscellaneous are dummy that equal one if a company has a blockholder of any of these categories that holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Table 5 Dividends and family stake The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include dividend pay-outs, the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Founding family 20-50% and 50% or more is a dummy variable that equals one if members of the founding-family hold between 20% and 50% or more than 50% of the voting rights respectively. The same logic is followed for the categories 20-75% and 75% or more. Family stake shows the stake and the stake squared the founding family holds in the company. 2 nd bh comprises dummies taking the value 1 according to the difference in stake between the family and the second largest blockholder. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
(1) Table 6 Dividends and firm stage The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include dividend pay-outs, the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Founder-and descendant-stage family firm indicates a dummy that equals one if the family is held by the founder or the descendants, respectively. Aged x-y years denotes dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the company age is situated in the given range. Lone family member is a dummy variable that equals one if only one family member is active or holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. Multiple family members is a dummy variable that equals one if more than one family member is active in the company or hold at least 20% of the voting rights. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) Table 7 Dividends and reputation The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include dividend pay-outs, the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Active-and passive-management denotes a dummy equalling 1 if a family member is actively managing the company or not. Family name and family no name is a dummy taking the value 1 if the company name is identical to the family name or not. Share capital and SEO increase are dummies equalling 1 if the company has issued new shares a year after respective dividend pay-outs. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Table 8 Total pay-outs and ownership structure The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include total pay-outs (sum of dividend and repurchases/earnings)), the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Blockholder is a dummy that equals one if a blockholder holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. Founding family is a dummy that equals one if members of the founding-family hold at least 20% of the voting rights. Private Investor, State, Industrial Corporation, Financial Corporation and Miscellaneous are dummy that equal one if a company has a blockholder of any of these categories that holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Table 9 Dividend yields and ownership structure The variables for the sample of 187 companies and 1228 firm-year observations include dividend yield (dividend per share/share price at year end), the wedge (ratio of voting rights divided by ownership rights), Tobin's Q, ROIC, firm age, firm size, leverage (total debt/total capital), 5-year sales growth and beta. Blockholder is a dummy that equals one if a blockholder holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. Founding family is a dummy that equals one if members of the founding-family hold at least 20% of the voting rights. Private Investor, State, Industrial Corporation, Financial Corporation and Miscellaneous are dummy that equal one if a company has a blockholder of any of these categories that holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights. All regressions include dummy variables for each industry and year. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
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